human being and learning, while 'doctrina' indicates the learning on its own. 3 On Locke's account, abstract words are "Names of abstract Ideas" (3.8.1). As a consequence, he writes, "every one, at first hearing, perceives the falshood of these Propositions; Humanity is Animality, or Rationality, or Whiteness" (ibid.). According to Locke, these are false because they assert that one idea is identical to another.
In ordinary assertions about external things, we therefore use concrete terms, such as 'man,' 'animal,' 'rational,' and 'white'. "All our Affirmations," Locke writes, "are only in concrete, which is the affirming, not one abstract idea to be another, but one abstract Idea to be join 'd to another" (ibid.) . That is to say, statements of the form φ is ψ, where φ and ψ are replaced by concrete terms assert that two ideas stand to one another in some relation other than identity.
As an example Locke offers, "a Man is White, signifies, that the thing that has the Essence of a Man, has also in it the Essence of Whiteness, which is nothing but a power to produce the idea of Whiteness in one, whose Eyes can discover ordinary Objects" (ibid.).
There are two puzzles about this passage that cancel each other out. First, Locke seems to assert that the sentence signifies its truth conditions. How is this compatible with the central thesis of his semantic theory that "Words in their primary or immediate Signification, stand for nothing, but the Ideas of in the Mind of him that uses them" (2.2.2)? Second, how is it compatible with the thesis that the example is supposed to illustrate, that affirmations using concrete terms assert that one abstract idea is joined to another? The answer must be that two immediately signified ideas are related indirectly, through some particular man. That particular man falls under the abstract idea man; thus, the word 'man' may be affirmed of him. He also has the power to produce the idea of whiteness in the sighted; thus, the word 'white' may be affirmed of him. 4 Locke hardly every uses abstract terms for substantial kinds. He disapproves of such expressions, thinking them scholastic corruptions of classical Latin. He suggests that these corruptions were motivated by "the Doctrine of substantial Forms, and the confidence of mistaken Pretenders to a knowledge that they had not," knowledge of the real essences of substances (3.8.2). Locke uses the words 'corporeality' and 'humanity' as names for abstract ideas at 4.7.13, but he asks the reader to forgive the expressions ("if I may use those barbarous Terms").
On the other hand, the doctrines that abstract terms are names of ideas and that concrete terms are satisfied by external things fit pretty well with Locke's usage in Essay 2.8.
Where he uses an abstract term such as 'whiteness ' ( § §16-19, 24) , 'coldness' ( § §16, 17), 'sweetness' ( §18), 'redness' ( §19) and 'softness', ( §24) he uses it to name an idea, while concrete terms such as 'white' ( § §16, 19, 20, 23) , 'cold' ( § §16, 21), and 'sweet' ( §16) are predicated of external objects. Locke's remarks about the denomination of objects by concrete secondary-quality terms at 2.8.16 and his remarks about the truth conditions for 'a man is white' in 3.8.1 may be properly reconstructed as a proto-Tarskian semantics for secondary-quality words. An object satisfies the predicate "is white" just in case the object has a power to produce the idea of whiteness.
The value of Locke's treatment is not that it accurately captures the semantics of ordinary language. It doesn't even always capture his usage through most of the Essay.
Incompatibly with his official account, he describes "Yellowness" as "a Power in Gold," and not as an idea at 2.23.10. Along the same lines, he doesn't use the word 'lightness,' in the Essay except once (4.16.4) meaning 'frivolity'; he argues at 3.4.10 that 'light' is "properly" a name for an idea, though, by extension, the word may be applied to the cause of that idea.
At 4.7.4, 'Red' and 'Blew' seem to be names of ideas.
The official account of Essay 3.8 doesn't seem to govern everything that Locke writes, but understanding it helps for at least two reasons. First, in his chapter on primary and secondary qualities abstract terms do seem to name ideas and concrete terms are almost always applied as predicates to external things. If Locke is going to carefully stick to the linguistic theory of Essay 3.8 anywhere else in the Essay, we would expect it to be Essay 2.8, where his purpose is "to make the difference between the Qualities in Bodies, and the Ideas produced by them in the Mind, to be distinctly conceived" (2.8.22). To the extent that the chapter on abstract and concrete terms helps us understand that project, we should be grateful for the illumination. Second, the theory of Essay 3.8 lets us understand what he means when he writes "Flame is denominated Hot and Light; Snow White and Cold; and Manna White and Sweet, from the Ideas they produce in us." 'White,' 'Cold,' and 'Sweet' are paronyms derived from the names of our ideas.
The Irreality of Secondary Qualities
Let me switch topics from semantics to metaphysics. According to Locke, primary qualities are real beings, intrinsic, explanatory entities that inhere in bodies and explain the production of our ideas. In contrast, he doesn't think of secondary qualities as real beings which our predicates ought to track. At 2.31.2, Locke complains that our terminology is misleading, since "the Things producing in us these simples Ideas, are but few of them denominated by us, as if they were only the causes of them; but as if those ideas were real Beings in them." With respect to predicates of fire, Locke argues, the word 'painful' is well-framed, while 'hot' and 'light' are misleading: "though Fire be call'd painful to the Touch, whereby is signified the power of producing in us the Idea of Pain; yet it is denominated also Light, and Hot; as if Light and Heat, were really something in the Fire, more than a power to excite these Ideas in us" (ibid.).
Locke's complaint is not that the words 'light' and 'hot' don't fit his recommended semantics for abstract and concrete terms. Rather, his complaint is that our secondaryquality predicates suggest a false ontology. The contrast he draws with 'painful' implies that he thinks that it would be more accurate to call fire 'lightful' and 'hotful.' On Locke's view, our present terminology misleads us into thinking that light and hot are "real Beings" in the fire. If they wore their dispositional nature on their sleeves, they wouldn't mislead us in that way.
When Locke denies that faculties are "real beings" (2.21.6), he doesn't mean to "deny there are Faculties both in the Body and Mind: they both of them have their powers of Operating, else neither the one nor the other could operate. For nothing can operate, that is not able to operate; and that is not able to operate, that has no power to operate" (2.21.20).
Locke believes talk of powers and faculties is legitimate in philosophy "cloathed in the ordinary fashion and Language of the Country" and intended for a general audience (ibid.).
When we are being careful, however, he believes that references to powers may be paraphrased away by talking about what a thing is able to do. Otherwise, ordinary ways of speaking will mislead us into thinking that powers are "so many distinct Agents" (ibid.).
Rejecting the existence of secondary qualities as real beings does not commit one to believing that no object can be rightly described as colored, noisy, tasty, smelly, or warm. A reasonable philosopher may believe that barns are red without believing that any rednesses, either particular or universal, inhere in them (Quine 1980, 10) . A realist might object that such philosophers have no account of why all these things are red, if not for the presence of a universal or a trope. Locke would reply that these objects are red because they are apt to produce ideas of red in us.
According to Locke, secondary qualities are not real entities that exist in bodies, and thus philosophers need not investigate deeply the conditions under which they come into existence and go out of existence. On his view, the real and explanatory entities are primary qualities, the bodies in which they inhere, ideas, and the minds in which they inhere. The states of affairs in which these entities are arrayed are the basic facts that make our assertion about secondary qualities true or false.
I mentioned earlier that Locke uses concrete words as names for ideas at Essay 4.7.4. Indeed, whenever Locke uses the concrete word 'red' in the Essay as a name (as opposed to using it as a predicate), and it's unambiguous whether it names an idea or a quality, it always names an idea (2.3.1, 2.18.6, 2.32.9, 3.4.11, and 3.4.16). This isn't what we would expect in light of the discussion of concrete and abstract terms at Essay 3.8. Nor, for that matter, is it what we would expect in light of Locke's thesis that secondary qualities are "Powers to produce various Sensations in us" (2.8.10). I would explain these oddities as follows: Locke doesn't usually treat powers are proper referents for names, because he doesn't believe that they are existing things. When used as names, concrete terms denote ideas by default.
Locke's Account of Secondary Qualities as a Semantic Doctrine
Locke doesn't offer direct arguments to show that secondary qualities are "Powers to produce various Sensations in us." Instead, he seems more interested in defending a theory of how primary qualities produce sensory ideas and in denying that our ideas of secondary qualities resemble something in objects. Where does the famous doctrine come from?
To answer the question, let us take a sympathetic step into Locke's way of looking at the world. Suppose you thought that the world, deep down, comprises bodies, their qualities, minds, and their ideas. If you thought that, then you would also think that when we said such things as red is a warm color, the smell of cut grass is like the smell of unripe almonds, and for middle C, the fifth is G, we were talking about our ideas and drawing comparisons between them. Of course, we mostly use secondary-quality words adjectivally and predicationally, in order, for example, to attribute colors to bodies (tomatoes turn red as they ripen and he's wearing a green shirt). Locke needs a bridge principle to make sense of our application of color words to bodies.
A good portion of scholastic philosophy of language stems from the opening chapter of de Interpretatione. There Aristotle asserts, "just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of-affections of the soul-are the same for all; and what these affections are likenesses of-actual thingsare also the same" (16a6-8). Undiluted, the passage suggests that reference between word and object depends on resemblance between idea and object. Locke embraces such a doctrine at least to the extent: of defending the reality of our mathematical knowledge, by appealing to the resemblance between our geometrical ideas and bodies. He writes, Is it true of the Idea of a Triangle, that its three Angles are equal to two right ones? It is true also of a Triangle, where-ever it really exists. Whatever other Figure exists , that is not exactly answerable to that Idea of a Triangle in his Mind, is not at all concerned in that proposition (4.4.6).
Locke does not embrace the doctrine to the extent of making resemblance a necessary condition for reference. With respect to color predicates, if the object produces the right idea, the object gets the relevant predicate, whether or not the object resembles the idea: "it is equally from that Appearance [the idea of blue], to be denominated Blue, whether it be that real Colour, or only a peculiar Texture in it, that causes in us that Idea" (2.32.14). This is how Locke saves the truth and certainty of our useful ordinary assertions about secondary qualities in the face of his thesis that ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble anything in bodies. On his account a thing is properly called red if it has the power to produce the idea, redness, in us. His claim that secondary qualities are powers to produce ideas in us is not a description of certain objects in the world, but rather a disguised description of how our secondary-quality predicates work.
Some Criticisms of Stuart's Reading
Stuart argues that Locke believes that bodies only are colored when they are being perceived.
In this section, I'll quibble with his readings of some texts. In the next section, I'll concede that his interpretation captures a certain tendency of Locke's thought and takes it to its logical extreme.
Stuart cites 2.8.17 in defense of the assertion that "Locke seems to hold that colors vanish and cease when eyes do not see them" (68). Locke sometimes uses the word 'colours' to refer to powers to produce ideas in us and sometimes uses the word to refer to the corresponding ideas. In 2.8.17, it seems to me, he makes it as clear as possible that his reference to colors is to colors considered as ideas: "let not the Eyes see Light, or Nose Smell, and all Colours, Tastes, Odors, and Sounds, as they are such particular Ideas, vanish and cease, and are reduced to their Causes i.e. Bulk, Figure, and Motion of Parts." Locke doesn't believe that objects produce ideas of colors when no one is looking at them, of course. The passage doesn't show that he denies that they have the corresponding qualities, which is the point that Stuart wants to establish.
According to Stuart, Locke means qualities by "Ideas" in this passage. If "Ideas" were taken to refer to ideas, he writes, "one would lose the intended contrast between primary and secondary qualities, since sensations of shapes also go out of existence when the eyes do not see" (93n4). I'm not persuaded. It seems to me that the clause 'as they are such particular Ideas' in the phrase, "all Colours, Tastes, Odors, and Sounds, as they are such particular Ideas, vanish and cease" means 'like they are in those particular ideas.' Locke's point is that nothing resembling ideas of secondary qualities remains behind when the ideas vanish. Since, on his view, ideas of primary qualities resemble something mind-independent in bodies, the contrast between ideas of primary and secondary qualities would remain. Stuart (69) also appeals to 2.8.23, where Locke contrasts primary qualities with other qualities on the grounds that primary qualities are "in the things themselves, whether they are perceived or not." In my opinion, Stuart has misunderstood Locke's distinction. The contrast is between primary qualities, which bodies have whether we perceive them or not, and secondary qualities, which bodies lack when they are too small to be perceived. Locke specifies that that's the relevant perceptual condition in the previous section. Primary qualities "are sometimes perceived by us, viz. when the Bodies they are in, are big enough singly to be discerned" (2.8.22). All bodies have primary qualities, even bodies that have been ground into imperceptibly small pieces (2.8.9), but imperceptibly small bodies lack powers to produce ideas in us. 
Locke's Flexibility Explained
Even though I disagree with Stuart in some of what he writes about the application conditions of secondary-quality predicates, I don't think that much hangs on this. Not believing that these terms correspond to entities in bodiess allows Locke a certain degree of flexibility in his treatment of their semantics. He exploits this flexibility by offering different semantics in different passages, depending on the task at hand. Sometimes Locke takes the ordinary conception that bodies have the secondary qualities that they appear to have to standard observers under standard conditions. At 3.8.1, he says that things are called 'white' if they can produce the idea of whiteness in people whose eyes can see ordinary objects. At 2.23.10, he appeals to ordinary lighting conditions: "to speak truly, Yellowness is not actually in Gold; but is a Power in Gold, to produce that Idea in us by our Eyes, when placed in a due Light." 6 In one passage, Locke suggests that objects don't always have the colors that they have at first glance. He writes, "when we set before our Eyes a round Globe, of any uniform colour, v.g. Gold, Alabaster, or Jet, 'tis certain, that the Idea thereby imprinted in our Mind, is of a flat Circle variously shadow'd, with several degrees of Light and Brightness coming to our Eyes" (2.9.8). His main point is that after sight presents the mind with an initial array of sense data, judgment habitually constructs a different sort of perception. The passage clearly implies, however, that a solid jet sphere is uniformly black in spite of initially presenting the mind with a variety of ideas of colors.
In contrast Locke sometimes writes as if he believes that everything has the secondary qualities that it seems to have in those circumstances regardless of the circumstances (Rickless 1997, 307-08 (4.4.4, compare 4.11.2) . He also seems to endorse the incorrigible conception of secondary qualities at 4.6.11, where he asserts that if we "put a piece of Gold any where by it self, separate from the reach and influence of all other bodies, it will immediately lose all its Colour and Weight." The relevant invisible fluid that sustains the color of gold is presumably light or its medium. He thus implies that objects lose their colors in the absence of light, and so color is not solely determined by the appearance of objects in standard lighting conditions (Stuart 2003, 68) .
In accordance with the incorrigible conception, what color are objects when no one is looking at them? Not the color they would seem to have to standard observers in standard conditions, we might think, or the conception would collapse into the ordinary one.
Not the color that the object might seem to some possible observer, or each unobserved object will have every possible color. Thus, I concede, if we push hard in a certain direction on the incorrigible conception of secondary qualities, we will end up with something like Stuart's reading.
We have a certain degree of freedom in how we arrange the semantics of these assertions and for some purposes we might prefer to use secondary-quality predicates which work in accordance with the incorrigible conception of secondary qualities and for others we might prefer to use more ordinary predicates. This explains the vacillations in Locke's usage.
The workings of our predicates are largely up to us. There is nothing to keep us from decreeing that an object is properly described as 'red' if it appears red to some observer (Bennett 1968, 115) .
In light of Locke's ontology, this vacillation is a mere variation of usage that could be nicely handled with his distinction between civil and philosophical uses of language. "By their civil Use," he means, "such a communication of Thoughts and Ideas by Words, as may serve for the upholding common Conversation and Commerce, about the ordinary Affairs and Conveniencies of civil Life, in the Societies of Men" (3.9.3). If we are using words with these purposes in mind, of course we want to distinguish between red and green paint, even if the paint is in sealed canisters and the canisters are in a dark storeroom. In such contexts, we ought to use the ordinary conception for our secondary-quality predicates.
"By the Philosophical Use of Words," Locke means, "such an use of them, as may serve to convey the precise Notions of Things, and to express, in general Propositions, certain and undoubted truths, which the Mind may rest upon, and be satisfied with, in its search after true Knowledge" (ibid.). The infallible conformity of our simple ideas with the corresponding powers in bodies is, as we have seen, a plank in Locke's account of the reality of our knowledge of the external world. The incorrigible conception of secondary-quality predicates may thus be construed as a semantic solution to an epistemic problem.
If we are willing to grant Locke that an idea of red is produced in us every time an object appears red, we could stipulate either that the predicate 'red' applies to a thing if and only if it produces that idea in normal observational conditions or that the predicate applies if the thing if it produces that idea, whether the circumstances are normal or not. On the civil use of our secondary-quality predicates, bodies have they colors they would seem to have to standard observers under standard conditions. On the philosophical use of our terms, bodies have exactly the colors that they seem to have. The former stipulation is better for practical purposes, while the latter is part of Locke's project of vindicating sensitive knowledge. Bodies will be colored whether we speak with the crowd or with the philosophers. If secondary qualities aren't real beings that our predicates ought to track faithfully, then Locke may reasonably alternate between such views, depending on his goals. 
